

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 359

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 8948

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: US DEL PAPER ON
26 OCTOBER BREZHNEV SPEECH

1. THERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF US MBFR DEL PAPER ANALYZING AND
SUGGESTING POSSIBLE LINE OF ALLIES IN PRESS BACKGROUNTERS
31 OCTOBER TO ITEMS OF SUBSTANCE CONTAINED IN BREZHNEV SPEECH
TO WORLD CONFERENCE OF PEACE FORCES IN MOSCOW ON 26 OCTOBER.
WE EXPECT CONTENT TO BE TAKEN OVER INTO SOVIET OPENING STATE-
MENT, SO THAT ALLIED SPOKESMAN QUARLES WILL HAVE TO BE PREPARED
TO DEAL WITHIN CONTENT IN HIS BACKGROUNDER SCHEDULED FOR
31 OCTOBER ALTHOUGH HE WILL AVOID TAKING ON BREZHNEV IN
DIRECT SENSE. PAPER WAS DISCUSSED IN AD HOC GROUP ON
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29 OCTOBER.

BEGIN TEXT:

BREZHNEV ON MBFR

1. BREZHNEV'S OCTOBER 26 SPEECH TO THE WORLD PEACE CONGRESS IN MOSCOW WAS THE MOST DETAILED EXPOSITION OF SOVIET POLICY ON MBFR ISSUED TO DATE. ACCORDING TO THE TEXT AVAILABLE TO US (ATTACHED) BREZHNEV CALLED FOR:

A. INCLUSION OF BOTH "FOREIGN AND NATIONAL" FORCES OF THE "COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS" (PRESUMABLY THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ARE MEANT, BUT THE POINT IS NOT EXPLICIT). MOSCOW'S OPENING POSITION IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS THUS RUNS COUNTER TO WESTERN PREFERENCE TO FOCUS ON US AND SOVIET FORCES IN PHASE I.

B. BREZHNEV SPECIFIED INCLUSION OF "LAND AND AIR FORCES." ON THIS POINT, TOO, THE SOVIET OPENING POSITION RUNS COUNTER TO WESTERN PREFERENCE FOR DEALING ONLY WITH GROUND FORCES.

C. REDUCTIONS, BREZHNEV SAID, "ALSO SHOULD APPLY TO UNITS ARMED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS." THIS FORMULA WAS NOT FURTHER DEVELOPED, BUT IT MAY INDICATE A DESIRE TO DEAL WITH MILITARY FORMATIONS RATHER THAN WITH DELIVERY SYSTEMS PER SE. BE THAT AS IT MAY, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE SOVIET OPENING POSITION WOULD CALL FOR ADDRESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THE OUTSET.

D. BREZHNEV LEFT IT AS AN OPEN QUESTION WHETHER REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE BY "EQUAL NUMBERS" OR "EQUAL PERCENTAGES." IN AN EVIDENT EFFORT TO PREJUDICE THE CASE FOR ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS, HE REVERTED TO AN IDEA ALREADY DEVELOPED IN SOVIET PROPAGANDA, NAMELY THAT FORCE REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT AFFECT THE EXISTING FORCE BALANCE "IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT IN GENERAL," I.E. THAT A BALANCE EXISTS WHICH SHOULD BE THE POINT OF DEPARTURE. THE REFERENCE TO "THE EXISTING BALANCE OF POWER IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT IN GENERAL" APPEARS TO INDICATE AN INTENTION TO COUNT

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ALLIED FORCES OUTSIDE THE NGA IN DEALING WITH REDUCTION PROPOSALS.

E. EXPECTATIONS ABOUT TIMING EXPRESSED BY BREZHNEV SEEMED DESIGNED TO SHOW SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO GET ON WITH REDUCTIONS, BUT WITHOUT EXPRESSING UNREASONABLY EARLY ANTICIPATIONS. BREZHNEV HOPED FOR AGREEMENT IN THE "EARLY FUTURE" WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS AS EARLY AS 1975. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, I.E., APPEARS TO SET UP A TWO-YEAR PERIOD, 1974-1975, IN WHICH A NEGOTIATED OUTCOME WOULD BE REACHED

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AND AT LEAST THE FIRST STEPS OF IMPLEMENTATION WOULD START.

2. BREZHNEV'S POINTS ARE ALL ONES WHICH HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED IN AD HOC GROUP DISCUSSIONS AND PLANNING. THE FACT THAT HE HAS PUT THEM TOGETHER IN AN AUTHORITATIVE EXPOSITION ON THE EVE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AN EXPOSITION WHICH WE CAN EXPECT TO BE REFLECTED IN DETAIL IN THE SOVIET OPENING STATEMENT, DOES SUGGEST THAT THESE ARGUMENTS WILL BE ADVANCED BY THE SOVIETS SOONER AND PERHAPS MORE FORCEFULLY THAN THEY MIGHT HAVE BEEN. HIS SPEECH THUS HIGHLIGHTS THE IMPORTANCE FOR THE ALLIES OF KEEPING THE FOCUS ON US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES FOR PHASE

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AND RESISTING SOVIET EFFORTS TO TELESCOPE THE NEGOTIATIONS INTO ONE PHASE

IN ADDITION, THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET ARGUMENT FOR EQUAL OR EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION UNDERSCORES THE NEED FOR ALLIES TO EMPHASIZE DISPARITIES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE AN EQUITABLE OUTCOME IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE REFERENCE TO THE BALANCE ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT AS A WHOLE UNDERSCORES THE NECESSITY TO RETAIN A SHARP FOCUS ON THE NGA FOR REDUCTIONS.

3. IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE BREZHNEV SPEECH WILL BE TAKEN OVER IN THE SOVIET OPENING STATEMENT. THEREFORE, WE MAY EXPECT PRESS QUESTIONS

ON OCTOBER 31 BASED ON THE POSITION TAKEN BY BREZHNEV,

AND, SPECIFICALLY, THE WESTERN VIEW OF:

-- INCLUDING AIR FORCES?

-- INCLUDING NUCLEAR FORCES?

-- INCLUDING STATIONED AND NATIONAL FORCES?

-- REDUCING BY EQUAL NUMBERS OR EQUAL PERCENTAGES?

A. SUGGESTED LINE OF REPLY

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TO THE EXTENT THAT THE SOVIET LEADER INDICATED A DESIRE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON MBFR, WE WELCOME HIS REMARKS. WE REGARD MBFR AS AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE PROCESS OF DETENTE IN EUROPE. INDEED, WE THINK OF IT AS

SOMETHING OF A TEST OF HOW FAR THE DETENTE PROCESS CAN BE DEVELOPED. BREZHNEV'S TESTIMONY OF THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE USSR VIEWS MBFR IS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 8948

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

THUS A POSITIVE INDICATOR.

WE DO NOT, HOWEVER, AGREE WITH A NUMBER OF THE IMPORTANT ASPECTS IN HIS STATEMENT, AND WE SHALL BE DISCUSSING THESE IN DETAIL WITH THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HERE IN COMING WEEKS. WE ANTICIPATE THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE TO PERSUADE THEM TO ACCEPT OUR VIEWS ON A NUMBER OF POINTS.

INCLUSION OF AIR FORCES

SPECIFICALLY, WE BELIEVE THAT MBFR SHOULD ADDRESS GROUND FORCES. THESE ARE THE FORCES WHICH CAN INVADE AND HOLD TERRITORY. WE BELIEVE THAT IF WE CAN ACHIEVE A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP OF GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WE WILL HAVE MADE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO STRENGTHENING PEACE AND REDUCING THE DANGER OF ANY KIND OF WAR IN EUROPE. OUR FORCES CAN BE QUICKLY MOVED IN AND OUT. COMPARISON OF

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AIR EQUIPMENT IS ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT AND WOULD ADD FURTHER ELEMENT OF COMPLEXITY TO ALREADY COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS.

INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR FORCES

WE KNOW FROM THE EXTENSIVE STUDIES WE HAVE MADE OVER THE PAST YEARS THAT MBFR IS BEST A COMPLEX SUBJECT. WE FEEL THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO TRY TO DEAL WITH OTHER ELEMENTS THAN GROUND FORCES IN MBFR. TO ATTEMPT TO INCLUDE AIR FORCES OR NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD, WE FEAR, BE TO UNDERTAKE A MUCH MORE COMPLICATED NEGOTIATION. THE RESULT WOULD BE TO DELAY AGREEMENT, AND PERHAPS EVEN MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENTS.

INCLUSION OF FOREIGN AND NATIONAL FORCES

WE BELIEVE THAT MBFR REDUCTIONS SHOULD PROCEED IN MORE THAN ONE PHASE. THE FIRST PHASE SHOULD, IN OUR VIEW, ADDRESS US AND SOVIET FORCES -- THE LARGEST FOREIGN FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THIS WOULD SIMPLIFY THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE OUTSET AND FACILITATE REACHING AN EARLY INITIAL AGREEMENT.

WE BELIEVE THAT A SECOND PHASE SHOULD FOCUS ON OTHER NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES AND MOVE TO PARITY IN THE FORM OF A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA.

REDUCTIONS BY EQUAL NUMBERS OR PERCENTAGES

AS TO THE SUGGESTION OF REDUCTIONS BY EQUAL NUMBERS OR BY APPLICATION OF EQUAL PERCENTAGES ACROSS THE BOARD, BOTH OF THESE APPROACHES ARE OVERSIMPLIFIED AND WOULD NOT OF THEMSELVES PROVIDE FOR AN EQUITABLE OUTCOME. THE IMPORTANT THING IN MBFR IS NOT THE COMPARISON OF THE FORCES TO BE REDUCED, BUT THE KIND OF MILITARY SITUATION WHICH WILL EXIST AFTER REDUCTIONS ARE CARRIED OUT. THE REDUCTION SCHEMES SUGGESTED IN THE SPEECH ARE SUPERFICIALLY SIMPLE AND EASY. BUT THEY DO NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IMPORTANT DISPARITIES IN THE FORCES WHICH NOW EXIST.

SPECIFICALLY, THE WARSAW PACT HAS MORE GROUND TROOPS IN THE AREA; IT HAS MORE TANKS, AND GEOGRAPHY FAVORS SOVIET REINFORCEMENT OVER AMERICAN. THE REDUCTION APPROACH SUGGESTED BY BREZHNEV WOULD NOT AMELIORATE THIS SITUATION, BUT AS A MATTER OF FACT WOULD MAXIMIZE THE EFFECT OF THESE DISPARITIES. WE BELIEVE THAT AN EQUITABLE OUTCOME WHICH ASSURED THAT NEITHER SIDE'S SECURITY WOULD BE DIMINISHED MUST BE BASED UPON AN APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS WHICH TAKES FULL ACCOUNT OF THESE DISPARITIES. END TEXT.HUMES
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